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a mix of aware and unaware consumers, a larger share of unaware
consumers makes information disclosure less likely to occur. Since the
firm is not interested in releasing information to unaware consumers,
a more precise targeting technology that allows the firm to better keep
unaware consumers in the dark leads to more disclosure. A regulator
may want to intervene in this market and impose mandatory disclo-
sure rules.
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1 Introduction
Adverse product effects are a serious economic problem. As a result of in-
formation disadvantages, consumers may be unaware of some low-quality
aspects of products, such as harmful radiation from computer monitors or
cell-phones, health risks due to nanoparticles or artificial sweeteners in food,
and side effects of medicines. A profit-seeking firm may use many ingredients
to different degrees to produce its products. Such ingredients are supposed
to improve the product’s performance or reduce the cost of production. How-
ever, these substances may have adverse effects on a consumer’s well-being.
Not only may such adverse effects be uncertain and of an unknown degree,
but the consumer may initially be unaware that, by consuming, she exposes
herself to such a risk. Additional examples are asbestos, nicotine, transgenic
fats, and flavor enhancers, whose health risks were and, for some consumers,
still are largely unknown. The recent debate on genetically modified agricul-
tural products has a similar flavor: Firms use products with certain genetic
modifications; consumers are imperfectly informed about the degree of such
modifications and whether they are harmful. Other specific examples include
Taiwan’s plasticizer food scandal, pork containing ractopamine in the U.S.,
and breast implants made of a suspect silicone gel by the French company
PIP.
In many of these examples, the consumer side is characterized by both,
uncertainty and unawareness. To capture this, we develop a simple and
unified monopoly model in which the consumer side is composed of a mix
of aware and unaware consumers. In the model, with some probability, an
ingredient of a product leads to a utility loss, e.g., due to health problems for
consumers. Some of the consumers are aware of the ingredient but uncertain
of its level and whether it is harmful. By contrast, unaware consumers are
not aware of the ingredient’s existence at all. Thus, unaware consumers suffer
from a biased prior. The monopolist firm knows whether or not the ingredient
is harmful, as well as the level contained in its product. It then decides about
its disclosure policy: It may fully, partially, or not at all disclose information
through advertising. Partial disclosure takes the form of awareness-enhancing
disclosure: The firm informs potential consumers that the product contains
an ingredient that may carry some health risk, and a fraction of initially
unaware consumers this information. Under full disclosure, the level of the
ingredient (and the exact health risk) is disclosed. However, even under full
disclosure, some consumers may remain unaware.
Our results are as follows. First, in the positive analysis, we find that
the firm will be more likely to advertise if its product is of higher quality,
if it has a higher share of initially aware consumers and if it has a lower
2
incremental share of aware consumers after advertising.1 A lower incremental
share of aware consumers after advertising is, from the firm’s viewpoint, due
to a better targeting technology, as a larger fraction of unaware consumers
will remain in the dark after advertising. If the firm has a high product
quality, and the incremental share of aware consumers after advertising is
large but the initial share of aware consumers is either small or large, then the
firm will sell to both aware and unaware consumers whether or not the firm
advertises or not. Otherwise, the firm will sell only to unaware consumers if
and only if it does not advertise. The firm’s expected profit decreases with
the consumer’s initial awareness, whereas the consumer surplus increases.
The increase of initially aware consumers benefits all consumers, as the price
is weakly decreasing in the share of initially aware consumers. The effect of
an increase in initial awareness on total welfare is ambiguous.
Second, from a public policy perspective, for a given entry decision,
mandatory disclosure policies make unaware consumers better off. In a mar-
ket with unaware consumers, we distinguish between awareness-enhancing
and full-disclosure policies. Awareness-enhancing disclosure refers to inform-
ing consumers that a particular ingredient is harmful, while full disclosure
refers to also disclosing the amount of the harmful ingredient that the product
contains. Awareness-enhancing disclosure can be enforced by the courts if
they punish the non-disclosure of the adverse effect of a particular substance
(as, e.g., was an issue in various class action suits against tobacco firms in
the U.S.). Alternatively, consumers may know about the health risk of par-
ticular ingredients, but be unaware that a product uses such ingredients;
awareness-enhancing disclosure policies then require firms to explicitly de-
clare all ingredients used. Awareness-enhancing disclosure makes consumers
better off if they are initially unaware of the potentially adverse effect. It
also makes initially aware consumers better off as long as they purchase some
units of the product after disclosure. In general, for given entry, more infor-
mation is better for consumers, but may not be in the interest of the firm.
Thus, under a consumer surplus standard, mandatory disclosure rules may
be chosen.
Results are more nuanced when endogenizing the firm entry decision.
We show that consumers are not necessarily better off when full rather than
awareness-enhancing disclosure is mandated. The reason is that imposing full
1A similar effect is also present in the work by Gabaix and Laibson (2006), who consider
a competitive market in which some consumers are unaware of add-ons. They show that
firms are more likely to disclose the add-on if the fraction of aware consumers in the
population is higher. Relatedly, von Thadden and Zhao (2012) show in a principal-agent
model that the principal will make all agents aware if the fraction of initially aware agents
is sufficiently high.
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disclosure may cause the monopolist not to enter, which may be consumer-
surplus reducing. Since awareness-enhancing disclosure is never privately
optimal for the firm, we show that the publicly chosen disclosure rule may
be qualitatively different from any potentially optimal disclosure strategy by
the firm.
If a firm can invest in reducing the level of the adverse effect, then manda-
tory disclosure rules affect the firm’s incentive to invest. We show that the
mandatory full-disclosure rule provides the firm with the strongest incentive
to reduce the adverse effect.
Related Literature: In uncertainty problems with information disclo-
sure, it is typically assumed that consumers know the distribution of the
relevant unknown attribute, although they do not know the exact value that
the attribute takes. The underlying adverse-selection problem can be solved
through voluntary information disclosure by the firm. It is well known that,
if such disclosure is costless, full unravelling results and the adverse-selection
problem is fully solved – see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman
(1981), Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and the generalized
model by Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990). However, if
disclosure is costly, no or only partial unravelling will occur (see, e.g., Shavell,
1994).2 After disclosure, consumers update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion
upon observing firms’ disclosure actions. In our setting, an opportunity cost
of disclosure arises endogenously since the information provided to aware
consumers spills over to some initially unaware consumers. Thus, our result
that there is no full unravelling is due to the fact that some consumers are
initially unaware of a variable that affects their willingness-to-pay function.
The law and economics literature has used the above approach to address
consumer protection issues.3 In the legal literature, Korobkin (2003) recom-
mends ex ante intervention by legislatures; this corresponds to imposing a
mandatory disclosure rule. However, this ex ante mechanism sometimes in-
efficiently prevents firms from entering, as we show in this paper. Polinsky
and Shavell (2006) compare mandatory to voluntary disclosure rules in a set-
ting in which two firms decide whether to acquire information. They show
that firms may have less incentive to acquire information under mandatory
disclosure. We note that if the legislator can require the seller to disclose
2With respect to the contracting literature on information disclosure, we refer to the
overview provided in Chapter 5 in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
3See, e.g., Shavell (2004) for extensive discussions of the law and economics literature
on this issue. A different remedy with respect to adverse effects is to define minimum-
quality standards that refer to product safety or product quality (see, e.g., Leland, 1979,
and Shapiro, 1983).
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all the possibly harmful substances, it matters how the seller discloses the
eye-opening information. If the seller puts the information only in the fine
print, the seller’s action constitutes mis-selling if the information does not
reach the consumers.
Other work has considered ex post judicial mechanisms. In the economics
literature, Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2008) examine the firm’s behav-
ior when it is liable to make a payment in the event of harm. However, in
our context, harm is often not contractible. Thus, this judicial mechanism
has limited applicability.4
According to a different class of informational problems, unaware con-
sumers do not know the attribute and do not know that they do not know
it and so on. For instance, Milgrom (2008) remarks that consumers of-
ten do not know which characteristics of a given product are relevant or
even that such characteristics exist. To analyze this class of information
problems, one has to give up common knowledge of the game (and rational-
ity), and assume a non-common prior between firm and consumers. From a
normative viewpoint, the consumers’ prior is biased, unless they are made
aware. This non-common prior approach has been used in a number of
recent behavioral-IO models – see, e.g., present-biased consumers (Della Vi-
gna and Malmendier, 2004) and the extension to diversely naive consumers
(Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006), consumers who are unaware of some options (Eliaz
and Spiegler, 2011); consumers who are unaware of some add-ons (Gabaix
and Laibson, 2006) or unaware of contingencies (Filiz-Ozbay, 2012; Auster,
2013); consumers with limited attention to a complex multi-attribute prod-
uct (Zhou, 2008); analogy-based-reasoning consumers (Mullainathan et al.,
2008); limited-recall consumers (Shapiro, 2006); consumers who are suscep-
tible to the law of small numbers (Spiegler, 2006).5 Our paper adds to this
literature by taking a closer look at disclosure rules. It highlights the role
of two dimensions: first, the role of the initial composition of the demand
4It is worth mentioning that some legal scholars suggest another ex-post judicial mech-
anism (see Korobkin, 2003; and Becher, 2008): By using the unconscionability doctrine
to interpret contracts, contracts with unconscionable terms (which, thus, put one party at
the mercy of the other) are not enforced. Unfortunately, this mechanism appears to be of
little help in our context because its implementation is difficult in the presence of adverse
effects.
5In the psychology literature, the related concept of awareness is availability (see Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1973). For a different, Bayesian approach of modeling contracting
with unawareness, see, e.g., Tirole (2009). Zhao (2014) extends Tirole (2009) to a model
with asymmetric awareness between a seller and a buyer and focuses on the transac-
tion cost of pre-contractual cognition of the buyer. By contrast, in this paper, unaware
consumers are biased in the sense that they are naive; thus, there is no pre-contractual
cognition involved.
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side, consisting of consumers who lack information but do not have biased
beliefs and others who do have biased beliefs; and second, the role of the
composition of the demand side after the disclosure that the product con-
tains a harmful substance. In a related paper (Li, Peitz, and Zhao, 2014),
we consider a vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers. In
contrast to that paper, the present paper explores the importance of the mix
between aware and unaware consumers before and after disclosure and the
public policy on information disclosure.
More broadly, our paper connects to the literature on informative adver-
tising (e.g., to Grossman and Shapiro, 1984, and more closely to the adver-
tising of product characteristics, as in Anderson and Renault, 2009). Our
contribution to that literature is to identify whether a monopolist has an in-
centive to advertise and how public policy can address market failure result-
ing from some consumers being unaware of certain product characteristics.
In particular, we address this issue in the context of targeted informative ad-
vertising (in particular, Esteban, Gil, and Hernandez, 2001 and 2004).6 This
literature addresses targeting to consumers who differ in their willingness-
to-pay and the way in which advertising can guide consumers to particular
products. By contrast, in our setting, from the firm’s viewpoint, better tar-
geting technology allows the firm to keep more unaware consumers in the
dark about a negative product characteristic, thus inflating their willingness-
to-pay.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 3 provides the analysis. Section 4 analyzes the public
policy of information disclosure. Section 5 augments the analysis to include
an investment decision by the firm to reduce the level of the adverse effect
– a decision taken prior to observing the actual level of the adverse effect.
Section 6 briefly discusses the effects of competition and taxation (excise tax
on the product). Section 7 concludes.
6Additional contributions in oligopoly contexts include Galeoti and Moraga (2008),
Iyer, Soberman, and Villas-Boas (2005), and Roy (2008).
7Another link is to the literature on persuasive advertising because advertising
“changes” preferences; see Footnote 10 below. However, in that literature, advertising
increases the willingness-to-pay of consumers, while, in our model, advertising to unaware
consumers reduces their willingness to pay as the result of bad news, which they otherwise
do not anticipate.
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2 The Model
A firm can incur an entry cost, which generates a new and untested product
with potential adverse effect and gives the firm monopoly rights over its
product (e.g., because of IP protection). To enter the market, the monopolist
has to incur an entry cost K. The firm sells a single product to a unit mass of
consumers. Consumers are aware of the existence of the product and know
the utility from its intended use. However, the firm’s product contains a
potentially harmful ingredient (e.g., asbestos, nicotine, artificial sweeteners,
etc.). The monopolist incurs constant marginal costs of production that
are normalized to zero. It sets its price (or, equivalently, quantity) and its
information-disclosure policy, as will be specified below. We assume that the
firm learns the quality of the product (i.e., the exact level of the product’s
adverse effect) only after investing.8
We introduce the possibility of unawareness about adverse effects into
a linear-quadratic representative-consumer model. In the context of infor-
mation disclosure policies, this model has also been used by Daughety and
Reinganum (2005).9 Aware consumers are aware of the potentially adverse
effect; however, absent information disclosure, they lack information about
whether such adverse effects are present and about the magnitude of these
effects. Unaware consumers are not aware that there are potentially adverse
effects, unless such information is disclosed. In effect, they have a biased
prior.
We develop a simple framework to analyze how awareness in the popu-
lation affects market outcomes. We then derive the welfare implications of
different mandatory disclosure rules when there are both aware and unaware
consumers in the market. To do so, we need some notations. We denote
• ρ0 as the initial share of aware consumers;
• u as a demand shifter that reflects the consumer’s willingness to pay
for the first unit when abstracting from possible adverse effects – it is,
thus, a measure of product quality for unaware consumers;
• θ as the amount of the adverse effect, uniformly drawn from [0, θ];
• a ≡ u − θ as the true quality measure (net of any adverse effects) of
the product;
8Thus, we abstract from the issue of quality tests (see, e.g., Matthews and Postlewaite,
1985).
9We have checked that our results also hold in a heterogeneous consumer model with
unit demand and a uniform distribution of the willingness-to-pay.
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• a˜ as the expected quality measure according to consumer beliefs; and
• p as the per-unit price of the product and q as the quantity sold by the
monopolist.
We postulate that the utility function of the representative consumer
takes the standard linear-quadratic form
U = (u− θ)q − 1
2
q2 − pq.
The firm may disclose the adverse effect of its product through adver-
tising; for simplicity, we assume that information disclosure is costless. In
addition, we assume that advertising is truthful.10 Advertising increases the
share of aware consumers to ρ1 = ρ0+∆ρ ≤ 1 with ∆ρ ≥ 0. A firm may want
to target this advertising to aware consumers. In one polar case, advertising
is perfectly targeted to aware consumers, i.e., ∆ρ = 0. In the other polar
case, advertising is non-targeted and reaches aware and unaware consumers
alike, i.e., ρ1 = 1. The precision of the targeting technology is defined as
∆ρ/(1− ρ0).
Note that targeting has become very prominent in the context of internet
advertising (see Evans, 2008; Goldfarb, 2014; and Peitz and Reisinger, 2014).
In our context, targeting may be based on observable consumer characteris-
tics that correlate with consumer awareness. A better targeting technology
is based on consumer characteristics that are more strongly correlated to
consumer awareness. Alternatively, targeting may be based on observed con-
sumer behavior. Here, the advertising firm may show ads only to consumers
who consume certain content (e.g., by placing the ad on media with a narrow
audience) or who have a certain history of behavior (based on information
collected through cookies). Again, observed consumer behavior must cor-
relate with the awareness of consumers to be harnessed by the advertising
firm.
We will consider comparative statics in the share of initially aware con-
sumers ρ0. In the analysis, we vary ρ0 while keeping ∆ρ constant. The
following interpretation motivates this modeling choice.
10This can be motivated by measures taken against misleading or false advertising.
Such advertising about product characteristics is, thus, within the domain of informative
advertising. However, since unaware consumers have biased beliefs, advertising changes
consumer preferences for the product at the moment of purchase – this is a feature of per-
suasive advertising. In contrast to work on persuasive advertising, in our setting, advertis-
ing “corrects” consumer preferences – i.e., ex post preferences are the true preferences. For
a monopoly model of persuasive advertising that allows for distorted preferences ex ante
or ex post, see Dixit and Normann (1978); for a survey on the economics of advertising,
see Bagwell (2007).
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Suppose that the firm sells its product through two distribution channels
A and B, but has to set a uniform price across channels. It caters to aware
consumers (experts), as well as to some unaware consumers (naives) through
channel A. The remaining unaware are served through distribution channel
B. If the firm discloses the level of the adverse effect of its product in channel
A, all consumers using this channel (ρ0 + ∆ρ) will become aware of the
adverse effect and learn its level (i.e., the value of θ). Comparative statics in
ρ0 then refers to some naive consumers in channel B listening to what expert
consumers have to say; experts may simply warn about the adverse effect if
they lack further information or, if they got the information about its level,
also communicate this piece of information. The more consumers in B that
listen to experts in A, the larger is ρ0.
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The timing of the game played by the monopolist firm and consumers
evolves as follows:
1. The firm decides whether to enter with a new product.
2. If the firm has entered, it observes the adverse effect θ as private infor-
mation.
3. The firm chooses whether to disclose information on θ through adver-
tising and sets its price p.
4. Consumers observe the price and, if applicable, the advertisement and
then make their purchasing decision.
At stage 4, consumers form beliefs about θ and face a decision problem
that yields demand functions. We solve for perfect Bayesian equilibria where
aware consumers are Bayesian and unaware consumers have constant biased
beliefs.
3 Analysis
In the first subsection, we focus on a monopolist who is already active in
the market and, thus, has sunk the entry cost. Here, we characterize the
profit-maximizing advertising (i.e., disclosure) and pricing decision and its
impact on profits and consumer surplus. In the second subsection, we then
endogenize entry.
11In general, ∆ρ might depend on ρ0. For example, if the imperfect targeting technology
delivers the information to half of all unaware consumers, then ∆ρ = (1− ρ0)/2.
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3.1 Private Disclosure for Given Entry
Suppose that the firm has entered and learned its type θ. We first determine
the firm’s profit-maximizing price given the share of aware consumers ρ. The
remaining share 1 − ρ of consumers are unaware. Their expected product
quality measure is u and, hence, their demand is u − p. The share ρ of
consumers are aware. Their expected product quality measure is a˜ and,
hence, their demand is a˜ − p. Consumers do not condition their quality
expectations on price.
The firm’s expected demand function is, therefore,
Q (p) =
{
(1− ρ) (u− p) + ρ (a˜− p) if p ≤ a˜,
(1− ρ) (u− p) if p > a˜.
The expected demand function has a kink at the point p = a˜. The firm’s
problem is maxp pQ (p). Solving the firm’s profit maximization problem at
stage 3, we obtain the firm’s pricing strategy as
p =
{
(1−ρ)u+ρa˜
2
if a˜ ≥ a,
u
2
if a˜ < a,
where
a =
√
1− ρ (1−√1− ρ)
ρ
u.
If the belief of aware consumers is above the threshold, the firm chooses a
price that generates positive demand from all consumers. If this belief is
below, the firm sets the monopoly price to unaware consumers – a price at
which demand from aware consumers is zero.
The corresponding profit (gross of entry costs) is
pi =
{
[(1−ρ)u+ρa˜]2
4
if a˜ ≥ a,
(1−ρ)u2
4
if a˜ < a.
(1)
In words, if a˜ is large enough, then the firm will sell its product to both aware
and unaware consumers, and it will determine the profit-maximizing price as
if it were facing only consumers with expected quality equal to the average
quality measure (1− ρ)u + ρa˜. However, if a˜ is small, the firm will sell its
product only to unaware consumers and will set its price as if it were facing
only consumers with quality measure u.
Observation 1 The threshold value a is decreasing in ρ.
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Observation 1 implies that if the firm chooses to serve both types of con-
sumers in the case of no advertising, it does so also in the case of advertising,
as this leads to a larger share of aware consumers. It is worth mentioning
that the firm will lower its price for a larger share of aware consumers since
it prefers to serve both types of consumers.
Observation 2 The profit-maximizing price is decreasing in ρ if the firm
decides to sell to all consumers and is constant otherwise.
This benefits all consumers, including those who remain unaware. We
return to this observation when considering consumer surplus implications
(see Proposition 2 below).
We consider the following intuitive solution: If a > â, (i.e., θ sufficiently
small), the firm discloses θ, and all those consumers who are aware after the
disclosure decision learn a; if a < â, the firm does not advertise, where the
threshold value â is to be determined later. The expected quality measure
of the aware consumers is then
a˜ =
{
â+u−θ
2
if a < â,
a if a > â.
The firm advertises if and only if its profit is higher with advertising
than without advertising, which gives a cutoff value â such that the firm
advertises if and only if a ≥ â. Note that in the extreme case with only
aware consumers, there would be full unravelling since we consider the special
case of zero exogenous disclosure costs. But this does not hold with a mixed
population, as information disclosure takes place only for a low level of the
harmful substance.
We distinguish two cases: In case 1, the firm sells to both types of con-
sumers if it chooses not to advertise. In case 2, the firm sells only to unaware
consumers if it chooses not to advertise. Note that if the firm chooses to
advertise, it will necessarily serve both types of consumers because it can-
not be profitable for the firm to engage in advertising and sell at the same
price as with no advertising to a smaller number of consumers (namely, the
remaining unaware consumers).
Case 1 – i.e., the firm sells to both types if it chooses not to advertise.
In this case, the firm with product quality â would choose to sell to both
types of consumers whether or not it advertises. According to equation (1),
the threshold value â is determined as follows:(
(1− ρ0)u+ ρ0 â+u−θ2
)2
4
=
((1− ρ1)u+ ρ1â)2
4
.
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In the equation, the left-hand side is the firm’s profit with no advertising,
while the right-hand side is its profit with advertising. The firm with quality
â is indifferent between advertising and not advertising. We obtain
â = u− ρ0θ
ρ0 + 2∆ρ
. (2)
The upside of advertising is that it enables the firm to distinguish its
product from those with higher levels of the harmful substance and, thereby,
obtain a higher profit, paying attention to aware consumers. The downside
of advertising from the firm’s point of view is that some initially unaware
consumers become aware of the adverse effect. We observe that â is increasing
in ∆ρ and decreasing in ρ0: The firm’s benefit from advertising increases with
the fraction of initially aware consumers, while the opportunity cost increases
with the additional share of consumers who become aware as the result of
the advertising.
We observe that â > u − θ if ∆ρ > 0. This means that, as long as
advertising makes some consumers aware of the harmful substance, there
will not be full unravelling, even though the exogenous disclosure cost is
zero.
Case 1 applies if the condition a˜N =
(
â+ u− θ) /2 ≥ a holds, where the
subscript N stands for no advertising. This condition is equivalent to
u ≥ A ≡ ρ0 (ρ0 + ∆ρ) θ(
1−√1− ρ0
)
(ρ0 + 2∆ρ)
. (3)
We observe that the critical value A that separates case 1 from case 2 is first
increasing and then decreasing in ρ0, while it is strictly decreasing in ∆ρ.
In case 2, the firm sells only to unaware consumers if it chooses not to
advertise. In this case, according to equation (1), the threshold value â above
is given by
(1− ρ0)u2
4
=
((1− ρ1)u+ ρ1â)2
4
,
where the left-hand side is the firm’s profit with no advertising, and the
right-hand side is its profit with advertising. The above equation gives
â = u− 1−
√
1− ρ0
ρ0 + ∆ρ
u. (4)
Equation (4) implies that â is increasing in ∆ρ and decreasing in ρ0 in case
12
2 since12
dâ
dρ0
=
2
(√
1− ρ0 − (1− ρ0)
)− (ρ0 + ∆ρ)
2 (ρ0 + ∆ρ)
2√1− ρ0
< 0
and
dâ
d∆ρ
=
(
1−√1− ρ0
)
(ρ0 + ∆ρ)
2 > 0.
The condition of serving only unaware consumers requires a˜N =
(
â+ u− θ) /2 <
a, which, by using (4) and simplifying, can be rewritten as u < A, where A
is as defined above.
From (4), we know that
â = u− 1−
√
1− ρ0
ρ0 + ∆ρ
u
> u− 1−
√
1− ρ0
ρ0 + ∆ρ
A
= u− ρ0θ
ρ0 + 2∆ρ
> u− θ,
which means that there will not be full unravelling for any θ > 0, ρ0 > 0,
and ∆ρ > 0.
Observation 3 A firm with high product quality measure a (and, thus, low
value of θ) will advertise, whereas a firm with low product quality a (and,
thus, high value of θ) will not, even though the exogenous disclosure cost is
zero.
This observation is due to an endogenous opportunity cost of disclosure
when targeting is imperfect. As a result, there is only partial unravelling.
The following proposition provides comparative statics results on the
firm’s profit-maximizing disclosure and selling decision.
Proposition 1 Suppose that a share ρ0 of consumers is initially aware, and
advertising informs not only aware consumers but also a share of unaware
consumers – namely, ∆ρ ≥ 0 of the population.
a) The set of parameters such that the firm advertises increases in ρ0 and
decreases in ∆ρ.
12The following inequality holds if 2
(√
1− ρ0 − (1− ρ0)
)
< ρ0, which, after simplifica-
tion, is equivalent to ρ0 > 0.
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b) If u and ∆ρ are large and ρ0 is either small or large, the firm will sell
to both aware and unaware consumers whether or not the firm
advertises. For small values of u and ∆ρ and intermediate values of
ρ0, the firm will sell only to unaware consumers if and only if it does
not advertise.
Part (a) of the proposition says that a larger share of initially aware con-
sumers is more likely to lead to the firm disclosing information.13 However,
a larger additional share of aware consumers after advertising, ∆ρ, reduces
the firm’s incentive to advertise. This suggests a complementarity between
ex-ante information that may stem from an awareness-improving media cam-
paign and the firm’s information-disclosure behavior. A case in point is the
outbreak of the Chinese milk scandal in 2008. Media coverage and infor-
mation dissemination among consumers increased consumers’ awareness of
the health risks of melamine in milk powder. In response to the scandal,
firms in the milk powder industry advertised that their product contained
no melamine.
According to part (b) of the proposition, case 1 – i.e., the firm will serve
both aware and unaware consumers even if it does not advertise – is more
“likely” to occur when (1) the product’s highest quality u is large; (2) ad-
vertising significantly increases the share of aware consumers; and (3) the
fraction of initially aware consumers is either very small or very large.
Recall that case 1 applies if the aware consumers’ expected quality in
the absence of advertisement, a˜N , exceeds the threshold value a. Increasing
the willingness-to-pay parameter u has two effects. First, it increases the
aware consumers’ expected quality in the absence of advertising a˜N . Second,
it also increases the threshold value a. The first effect, however, dominates
the second one. As a result, case 1 is more likely to occur as u increases.
Figure 1 illustrates this finding with the help of a numerical example in
which ρ0 = 0.4, ∆ρ = 0.2, and θ = 1. In this example, case 1 applies if u ≥
1.33 and case 2 applies if u ≤ 1.33. Consistent with part (b) of Proposition
1, in case 1, the firm advertises if and only if θ ≤ 0.5, whereas, in case
2, the firm advertises if and only if θ ≤ (1−√1− 0.4)u/ (0.4 + 0.2) =(
1−√0.6)u/0.6. Considering the adverse effect θ as initially uncertain, the
figure also illustrates that the monopolist is more likely to advertise as the
willingness-to-pay parameter u initially increases and that his incentives to
advertise remain unaffected, when this parameter is increased starting from
a larger value.
13Relatedly, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and von Thadden and Zhao (2012) also derive
the self-reinforcing pattern of unawareness, meaning that population with a high extent
of unawareness will preserve unawareness.
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Next consider an increase in ∆ρ – i.e., a reduction in the precision of
the targeting technology. Because advertising makes more consumers aware,
firms with a high product quality are also rather reluctant to advertise. Tak-
ing this into account, aware consumers have a higher expectation about prod-
uct quality in the absence of advertising. On the other hand, an increase in
∆ρ has no effect on the threshold value a. Consequently, increasing ∆ρ
makes case 1 more “likely” to occur. Figure 2 illustrates this finding with
the help of a numerical example, where u = 1.33, ρ0 = 0.4, and θ = 1. In
this example, case 1 applies if ∆ρ ≥ 0.2 and case 2 applies if ∆ρ ≤ 0.2. The
firm advertises if and only if θ ≤ 0.4/ (0.4 + 2∆ρ), whereas, in case 2, the
firm advertises if and only if θ ≤ 1.33 (1−√1− 0.4) / (0.4 + ∆ρ). Figure
2 also illustrates part (a) of Proposition 1 (where it refers to ∆ρ), as the
boundary for advertising is decreasing in ∆ρ. Considering the adverse effect
θ as initially uncertain, this result says that the less precise the targeting
technology, the less likely is the monopolist to advertise.
The effect of an increase in the share of initially informed consumers ρ0
is less obvious. Both a˜N and a are decreasing in ρ0. The decreasing rate of
a˜N is larger (smaller) than that of a when ρ0 is small (large). Thus, case 1
is more “likely” to apply to small and large ρ0, but less so for intermediate
values. Figure 3 illustrates this finding with the help of a numerical example,
where u = 1. 33, ∆ρ = 0.2, and θ = 1. In this example, case 1 applies if
ρ0 ≤ 0.4 and ρ0 ≥ 0.47; case 2 applies if 0.4 ≤ ρ0 ≤ 0.47. In case 1, the
firm advertises if and only if θ ≤ ρ0/ (ρ0 + 0.4). In case 2, the firm advertises
if and only if θ ≤ 1. 33 (1−√1− ρ0) / (ρ0 + 0.2). Moreover, the boundary
that separates advertising from not advertising is increasing in ρ0. Thus,
Figure 3 also illustrates part (a) of Proposition 1 (concerning ρ0).
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Figure 1: ρ0 = 0.4, ∆ρ = 0.2, θ = 1.
Figure 2: u = 1. 33, ρ0 = 0.4, θ = 1.
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Figure 3: u = 1. 33, ∆ρ = 0.2, θ = 1.
One further result in the positive analysis is worth pointing out. Con-
sider the effect of the availability of information disclosure on the monopo-
list’s optimal selling strategy. If the firm cannot disclose any information to
consumers, it is more likely for the firm to sell to unaware consumers only.
In other words, if the instrument of information disclosure is available to the
firm, it is more likely to sell to both types of consumers than in its absence.
To show this, consider the alternative case in which the firm cannot disclose
any information. The firm will sell to both types if the aware consumer’s ex-
pected quality a˜ ≥ a, in which case we have a˜ = u− θ/2, which is equivalent
to
u ≥ B ≡ ρ0θ
2
(
1−√1− ρ0
) .
It is straightforward to see that B < A. Even if the additional share ∆ρ
of aware consumers makes the firm more likely to sell to both types, the
likelihood of selling to both types is necessarily smaller than in the absence
of the instrument of information disclosure, when aware consumers cannot
draw any inferences from the firm’s non-disclosure decision.
Surplus measures and awareness. In the following, we focus on the
effect of the initial share of aware consumers on profits, consumer surplus
and total surplus. The initial share is a key characteristic of the composition
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of consumers. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to case 1, in which the
firm serves both aware and unaware consumers whether or not it advertises.
(Some of the results will be helpful is our subsequent analysis of mandatory
disclosure policies in Section 4.)
The expression of A, defined by (3), cannot exceed the value 2θ.14 Hence,
only case 1 is relevant as long as u ≥ 2θ, which is assumed to hold in the
remainder of the paper.
We derive the firm’s profit, consumer’s surplus and the total surplus
as a function of aware consumers’ quality measure a. Ex post, without
advertising, the quantity sold to the unaware consumer is Qu = u − pN ,
while the quantity sold to the aware consumer is Qa = a˜N − pN , where
pN = ((1− ρ0)u+ ρ0a˜N) /2.
With advertisement, the quantity sold to unaware consumers is Qu (a) =
u− p (a), while the quantity sold to aware consumers is Qa (a) = a− p (a) ,
where p (a) = ((1− ρ0 −∆ρ)u+ (ρ0 + ∆ρ) a) /2.
The firm will advertise when the quality of its product is high, a > â; and
it will remain silent when the quality of its product is low, a < â. Given the
product’s quality a, the aware consumer’s utility is
Ua (a) =
{
(a− p (a))Qa (a)− 12Q2a (a) , if a > â
(a− pN)Qa − 12Q2a, if a ≤ â
; (5)
the unaware consumers’ utility is
Uu (a) =
{
(a− p (a))Qu (a)− 12Q2u (a) , if a > â
(a− pN)Qu − 12Q2u, if a ≤ â
; (6)
the firm’s profit, by equation (1), is
pi (a) =
{
1
4
[(1− (ρ0 + ∆ρ))u+ (ρ0 + ∆ρ) a]2 , if a > â
1
4
[(1− ρ0)u+ ρ0a˜N ]2 , if a ≤ â ;
the total surplus from aware consumers’ consumption is
TSa (a) =
{
aQa (a)− 12Q2a (a) , if a > â
aQa −Q2a/2, if a ≤ â ;
and the total surplus from unaware consumers’ consumption is
TSu (a) =
{
aQu (a)− 12Q2u (a) , if a > â
aQu −Q2u/2, if a ≤ â .
14This is seen as follows: A = ρ0 (ρ0 + ∆ρ) θ/
((
1−√1− ρ0
)
(ρ0 + 2∆ρ)
) ≤
ρ0θ/
(
1−√1− ρ0
) ≤ 2θ, where the last inequality holds as long as ρ0 > 0.
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The firm’s expected profit is given by
Epi =
∫ â
u−θ
[(1− ρ0)u+ ρ0a˜N ]2
4θ
da
+
∫ u
â
[(1− (ρ0 + ∆ρ))u+ (ρ0 + ∆ρ) a]2
4θ
da. (7)
The expected consumer surplus is given by
ECS =
∫ â
u−θ
1
θ
{ρ0Ua (a) + (1− ρ0)Uu (a)}da
+
∫ u
â
1
θ
{(ρ0 + ∆ρ)Ua (a) + (1− (ρ0 + ∆ρ))Uu (a)}da, (8)
and the total surplus is given by
ETS =
∫ â
u−θ
1
θ
{ρ0TSa (a) + (1− ρ0)TSu (a)}da
+
∫ u
â
1
θ
{(ρ0 + ∆ρ)TSa (a) + (1− (ρ0 + ∆ρ))TSu (a)}da. (9)
The following proposition establishes how the consumers’ initial aware-
ness ρ0 affects surplus measures.
Proposition 2 Conditional on the firm having entered the market, the fol-
lowing holds:
a) The firm’s expected profit decreases with the consumer’s initial awareness
ρ0;
b) The consumer’s surplus increases with the his initial awareness ρ0;
c) The effect of an increase in ρ0 on the total welfare is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix.
In part (a) of the proposition, intuitively, a firm can charge a higher price
to the unaware consumers, who are incorrectly “optimistic” about the firm’s
product. Thus, its profit decreases as awareness increases in the population.
With respect to part (b) of Proposition 2, as awareness increases in the
population, consumers face a lower price (see Observation 2), and their prob-
ability of making a correct decision increases. This leads to an increase in con-
sumer surplus. As pointed out above, due to the price effect, an awareness-
increasing shock also positively affects those consumers whose awareness is
not affected by the shock.
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The following describes the intuition for part (c) of Proposition 2 that
social welfare may be higher with unaware consumers than with aware con-
sumers. Note that a monopoly seller always sets a price higher than the
socially optimal level. This leads to too little consumption in the market
with complete information. If consumers are unaware of the potentially ad-
verse effect, they consume a larger quantity; if the firm hides the information,
the consumer’s demand is larger since the adverse effect shifts the consumers’
willingness-to-pay upwards. Thus, the distortions created by monopoly and
unawareness go in opposite directions. Consequently, in the presence of mar-
ket power, consumer unawareness is not necessarily detrimental to social wel-
fare measured as total surplus. Whether total surplus is larger with aware
consumers than with unaware consumers depends on the values the parame-
ters take. If the quality u is large relative to the potential size of the harmful
substance, then total surplus is decreasing with consumer awareness.
3.2 Entry Decision
In this subsection, we turn to the firm’s entry decision at stage 1 and its
consumer surplus implication. The firm will enter the market and introduce
a new product if and only if the expected gross profit exceeds the entry cost
K; i.e., Epi ≥ K. With endogenous entry, depending on parameter values,
the firm optimally chooses one of the three options: (1) the firm does not
enter; (2) the firm enters and does not disclose; or (3) the firm enters and
(partially) discloses. Clearly, with entry, there are also no parameters such
that the firm optimally chooses awareness-enhancing disclosure. The reason
is that a firm of type θ′ such that all types θ ≤ θ′ disclose has a strict incentive
to disclose its type, as well.
From Proposition 2, we know that increasing the consumers’ initial aware-
ness ρ0 reduces the firm’s profit and, hence, may make entry unprofitable for
the firm. The decision of the firm not to enter harms those consumers who
would receive a strictly positive surplus in the case of entry. The next corol-
lary, which follows our Proposition 2, shows that the consumer surplus is
non-monotone in the consumer’s initial awareness ρ0.
Corollary 1 a) If K < Epi|ρ0=1−∆ρ then the consumer surplus is strictly
increasing in ρ0;
b) If Epi|ρ0=1−∆ρ < K < Epi|ρ0=0 then there exists ρ̂0 ∈ (0, 1−∆ρ) such that
the consumer surplus is increasing on the interval (0, ρ̂0) and decreasing
discontinuously at ρ̂0 and remains zero on the interval (ρ̂0,∆ρ).
c) If K > Epi|ρ0=0 then the consumer surplus is zero for any ρ0.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Increasing consumer awareness raises the consumer surplus, as long as it
does not impede the firm’s entry. But it is possible that consumer awareness
is increased by a sufficiently large extent such that the firm does not want to
enter in the first place, and, hence, reduces the consumer surplus to zero. This
corollary has important implications for the evaluation of different mandatory
disclosure rules, which will be discussed in the next section.
4 Mandatory Disclosure Rules
In this section, we turn to consumer protection policies that may be intro-
duced by the regulator, the consumer protection authority, or the legislator.
The party introducing such a policy commits itself to applying the rule un-
conditionally. In our model, this means that the rule is implemented at some
prior stage, which can be called stage 0. We explore the implications of two
simple information-disclosure policies.
One policy is mandatory awareness-enhancing disclosure, according to
which the firm is forced to reveal only the existence of θ (or, equivalently,
the public authority performs an awareness-improving campaign itself). As
mentioned before, in the alternative setting – in which consumers know the
negative effect of an ingredient, but unaware consumers do not suspect that
the product contains the ingredient – the firm is forced to disclose that this
ingredient is contained in the product, a possibility that unaware consumers
ignored. It is then up to the firm to decide whether to disclose the exact
amount of θ. The awareness-enhancing disclosure raises the proportion of
initially aware consumers from ρ0 to ρ
′
0.
The other policy is mandatory full disclosure, according to which the firm
must reveal all the information that it has – that is, the existence and the
exact amount of θ. We assume that revealing the exact amount of θ may
increase consumer awareness from ρ0 to ρ
′′
0(≥ ρ′0) with ρ′′0 − ρ0 ≡ ∆ρ, as
consumers may pay more attention to the information.
An extreme case is that mandatory awareness-enhancing disclosure makes
all the consumers aware; i.e., ρ′0 = 1. If so, after the awareness-improving
campaign, the model turns out to be one in which all consumers are uncertain
but aware of the amount of θ. Because we assume that it is costless to
disclose information, the unravelling logic tell us that there is full information
disclosure. Thus, mandatory partial information disclosure and mandatory
full information disclosure are equivalent in this case. If ρ′′0 > ρ
′
0, the full-
disclosure rule leads to more aware consumers than the awareness-enhancing
disclosure rule.
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No mandatory disclosure rule. If there is no mandatory disclosure
rule, the proportion of initially aware consumers is ρ0. According to our
previous analysis, the firm will advertise if a > â, with â given by (2). The
firm’s profit and the consumer surplus are given by (1) and (8) and are
denoted by Epin and ECSn, where n represents no mandatory disclosure
rule.
Mandatory awareness-enhancing disclosure. With the mandatory
awareness-enhancing disclosure rule, the firm’s behavior and, hence, the con-
sumer surplus, the firm’s profit and the total surplus are exactly the same as
in the case of no mandatory disclosure rule, except that now the proportion
of initially aware consumers is ρ′0 instead of ρ0 with ρ
′
0 ≥ ρ0. We denote the
firm’s profit and the consumer surplus by Epia and ECSa, where a represents
mandatory awareness-enhancing disclosure rule. As we noted in the previous
subsection, the monopolist would never choose an advertising strategy fea-
turing this type of disclosure. However, for some parameters, the regulator
optimally imposes such a rule ex ante.
Mandatory full disclosure. With the mandatory full information dis-
closure rule, the proportion of aware consumers is ρ′′0 = ρ
′
0 + ∆ρ, where
∆ρ ≥ 0. Moreover, aware consumers are fully informed about the product’s
adverse effect. Consequently, the firm’s profit and the consumer surplus are
given by (1) and (8), by replacing â with u − 1, ρ0 with ρ′′0, and are de-
noted by Epif and ECSf , where f represents the mandatory full information
disclosure rule.
After careful calculation and comparison, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Conditional on the firm having entered the market, profits and
consumer surplus under the different mandatory disclosure rules are Epif <
Epia < Epin and ECSf > ECSa > ECSn.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above lemma suggests that the mandatory disclosure rule protects
consumers. The stronger the requirement, the more protective the law is.
A mandatory partial information disclosure rule increases the proportion
of aware consumers compared to no disclosure, which directly increases con-
sumer surplus, because fewer consumers make biased purchase decisions. Fur-
thermore, the increased consumer awareness provides the firm with a stronger
incentive to disclose information, which increases the consumer surplus fur-
ther. A mandatory full information disclosure not only weakly increases
consumer awareness, but also provides consumers who, after disclosure, are
aware of the presence of an adverse effect with the full information about the
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level of that effect, which makes it possible for consumers to make better-
informed decisions. Thus, it leads to the largest consumer surplus among the
three regimes.
In many real-world situations, laws oblige sellers to disclose their private
information about the quality of their products. However, the theoretical
justification is not obvious. The well-known unravelling reasoning tells us
that a seller will voluntarily disclose all the quality information, as long as the
information-disclosure cost is zero. Unawareness, however, undermines this
full disclosure result, and explains why it is possible that only high-quality
firms choose to disclose. Mandatory disclosure rules increase awareness and,
hence, raise consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits. Given the mix
of aware and unaware consumers, even if the cost of information disclosure is
zero for the firm, imposing mandatory disclosure is in the consumers’ interest,
as it protects them.
Taking the firm’s entry decision at stage 1 into account, leads to a more
nuanced result captured by the following proposition, which directly follows
from the above:
Proposition 3 a) If K < Epif then the consumer surplus is highest under
the mandatory full information disclosure rule.
b) If Epif < K < Epia then the consumer surplus is highest under the
mandatory awareness-enhancing information disclosure rule.
c) If Epia < K < Epin then the consumer surplus is highest without a manda-
tory information disclosure rule.
d) If K > Epin then the consumer surplus is zero in all regimes.
Although a stronger information disclosure rule provides better protec-
tion for consumers, it may discourage the firm’s investment and, hence, hurt
consumers from an ex ante perspective. The optimal information disclosure
rule responds to the tradeoff between the benefit of providing information to
consumers and the cost of impeding the firm’s entry. The smaller the entry
cost, the more demanding the optimal information disclosure rule. If the cost
is small, even the strongest mandatory information disclosure rule will not
impede the investment. Hence, consumers are best off if the mandatory full
information disclosure rule is in place. As the investment cost increases, when
the investment becomes unprofitable with the mandatory full disclosure rule,
but not with the mandatory awareness-enhancing disclosure rule, the latter
rule is the best consumer-protection policy in this case. As pointed out in the
previous section, the firm would never choose such a rule. Thus, the regulator
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may want to require the firm to disclose qualitatively different information
than what the firm would consider. As mentioned above, if unaware con-
sumers know that a certain ingredient has adverse effects but are unaware
that the product may contain this ingredient, the awareness-enhancing dis-
closure rule requires the firms to list all ingredients of the product (but not
their amounts). We currently observe this policy applied to food products
in a number of countries. Those consumers who would be unaware absent
this mandatory disclosure, but who receive the information that the firm has
been required to post, increase the overall fraction of aware consumers. This
increases consumer surplus relative to a no-disclosure rule, but still allows the
firm to make an expected (gross) profit larger than the investment cost. As
the investment cost continues to increase, even awareness-enhancing disclo-
sure will deter the firm’s investment. In this case, no mandatory information
disclosure rule should be imposed.
5 Investment in Reducing the Adverse Effect
In many real-world situations, firms are aware as early as at the product
design stage that a particular ingredient is potentially harmful. They may
take steps to limit the required level of that ingredient; in the extreme, they
may design the product so as to avoid the use of the ingredient altogether.
Our analysis is easily extended to allow for (observable or unobservable)
effort in the reduction of the amount of the ingredient θ prior to stage 1,
but after the regulator has chosen its mandatory disclosure rule. How do
investment costs affect the optimal mandatory disclosure policy? To address
this question, suppose, for simplicity, that the firm can completely avoid
or remove the adverse effect of its product by exerting a costly effort, with
associated cost C. In this special case, it is immaterial whether or not effort
is observable.15 The firm’s gross profit then becomes pi = u2/4.
Under the mandatory full disclosure rule, the firm exerts such an effort
to remove the adverse effect if C ≤ Cf = pi − Epif . Under the mandatory
awareness-enhancing disclosure rule, the firm will exert such an effort if C ≤
Ca = pi − Epia. If there is no mandatory disclosure rule, the firm will exert
effort if C ≤ Cn = pi − Epin. It follows from Lemma 1 that Cf > Ca >
Cn. This shows that the mandatory disclosure rule gives a firm incentives
to remove the adverse effect from its product. The more demanding the
disclosure rule, the stronger the incentives for the firm to exert the effort.
The fact that Ca > Cn indicates that a firm’s incentive to reduce the adverse
effect increases with consumer awareness.
15Since disclosure is costless, a firm will always disclose if it has exerted effort.
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Mandatory disclosure positively affects consumers. It benefits consumers
by not only providing them with more information to make correct purchas-
ing decisions, but also gives the firm incentives to reduce its product’s adverse
effect.
The possibility of eliminating the adverse effect by exerting a fixed cost
C increases the set of parameters such that the mandatory full disclosure
rule is the optimal disclosure rule from the consumers’ point of view. Indeed,
consider the case in which Epif < K < Epia and Ca < C < Cf . In our
previous setting, from proposition 3, the mandatory full disclosure rule was
not optimal for consumers because it impeded the firm’s investment K. In
our current setting, however, when Epif < K < pi − C, the mandatory full
disclosure rule does not impede the firm’s investment K. Indeed, the firm
can obtain strictly positive profit by investing K and then exerting effort C.
Consequently, the mandatory full disclosure rule is optimal for consumers.
Note further that the mandatory awareness-enhancing disclosure rule is still
the optimal rule for consumers when pi−C < K < Epia, since the mandatory
full disclosure rule impedes the firm’s investment K. We summarize our
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 a) The mandatory full disclosure rule provides the firm with
the strongest incentive to reduce the adverse effect of its product, while
no mandatory disclosure rule provides the weakest incentives.
b) There exist parameters for each rule to be optimal for consumers. The
possibility of exerting an effort to remove the adverse effect enlarges
the set of parameters such that the mandatory full disclosure rule is
optimal for consumers, and reduces the set of parameters such that the
no-disclosure rule is optimal for consumers.
To make as transparent as possible our result on the firm’s effort to reduce
the adverse effect, we proposed a particular setting with binary actions and
the possibility to completely remove it. Is is straightforward to extend the
analysis in these two respects.
First, with binary effort choice and the possibility to only partly remove
the adverse effect to θ − ∆θ, the equilibrium effort, entry, disclosure and
price decision will depend on whether or not effort is observable, as it affects
the updating of aware consumers. If it is not observable, we can truly speak
of moral hazard, as consumers may not be able to infer the firm’s effort
decision when making their purchasing decision. We do not formally analyze
this setting as the content of the qualitative findings about the desirability
of mandatory disclosure rules remains unchanged irrespective of the size of
∆θ and the observability of the effort decision.
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The observability of the investment, however, does affect the strength of
the firm’s investment incentive whenever θ − ∆θ > 0. Unobservability of
corresponding effort weakens the firm’s incentive to reduce the adverse effect
of its product under the no information disclosure rule or the mandatory
awareness-enhancing disclosure rule.16 Hence, the mandatory full disclosure
rule is more likely to be socially beneficial when effort is unobservable than
when it is observable.
Second, the firm may choose θ from the positive real numbers with the
associated cost being infinite for θ = 0 and zero for θ turning to infinity.
Assuming that this cost function is continuously differentiable and convex,
provides a unique θ for the three mandatory disclosure rules under consider-
ation. In this setting, mandatory disclosure leads to more effort (i.e., lower
value of θ) than awareness-enhancing disclosure, which, in turn, leads to
more effort than in the absence of mandatory disclosure. This ranking holds
whether or not the investment is observed by aware consumers.
6 Discussion
Competition: We have restricted our analysis to a monopoly, but it is
straightforward to set up an oligopoly model with linear demand. While
we do not pursue a formal analysis here, a few points are worth making.
In the case of competition, a firm (which has information about its own
and its competitors’ level of the adverse effect) may have an incentive to
reveal information about adverse product effects if this makes its competitors
appear sufficiently worse than itself. Therefore, there may be information
disclosure by some firm even if its adverse effect is large in absolute terms.
The result is akin to the one with respect to revealing attribute information
in comparative advertising (see Anderson and Renault, 2009).
16The reasoning is as follows. Suppose that the effort is observable; then, aware con-
sumers hold the correct belief that the adverse effect is uniformly distributed on
[
0, θ
]
if
a firm shirks. Conditional on shirking, the quality of a product with no advertising will
be regarded as a˜N = u − θ. Suppose, instead, that the effort is unobservable. Consider
an equilibrium in which the firm exerts effort. If the firm adopts the equilibrium strategy
and aware consumers form the correct belief, then the quality of a product with no ad-
vertising will be regarded as a˜′N = u −
[
θ −∆θ]. Notice that a˜′N > a˜N . After shirking,
a firm has two options: disclosing information or hiding information. If the firm discloses
information, its profit is the same as in the case of observable effort. If the firm hides
information, then the quality of its product will be regarded as a˜′N , since consumers can
not observe the shirking behavior and, therefore, still hold the equilibrium belief. In this
case, the firm earns a higher profit than in the case of unobservable effort. To sum up,
unobservability of effort makes shirking more profitable and, therefore, weakens the firm’s
incentive to reduce the adverse effect.
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Within the corresponding duopoly model extended by the inclusion of two
potentially harmful ingredients, firms may end up in a prisoner’s dilemma,
with both of them disclosing information on the ingredient in which they
have a comparative advantage. In fact, both of them would be better off
if they could jointly agree not to disclose information. However, given its
rival’s strategy of information disclosure, it is optimal for a firm to disclose
information in the dimension in which it performs better than its competitor.
Thus, the message is that competition renders the problem that a firm may
refrain from information disclosure less severe.
We conjecture that our insight – that the awareness-enhancing disclo-
sure rule may be better than the mandatory full disclosure rule – also ap-
plies to imperfect competition. Indeed, for a range of investment costs, the
awareness-enhancing disclosure rule will keep both firms active in the mar-
ket, while mandatory full disclosure may lead to market exit by some firms
and, thus, to a monopoly position for the remaining firm. The resulting pric-
ing inefficiency tends to reduce consumer surplus. Future work may want to
take a systematic look at imperfectly competitive markets beyond what has
been done in Li, Peitz, and Zhao (2014) in a simple vertical differentiation
duopoly.
Taxation: Suppose that, for each unit of the product that the firm
sells, the firm (or the consumer) has to pay an excise tax τ > 0. Our
qualitative finding continues to hold true for τ > 0.17 Since equilibrium
demand decreases in τ , the firm’s profit and consumer surplus are decreasing
in τ .
Increasing the tax rate is formally equivalent to reducing u. Thus, when
the tax rate τ is marginally increased, starting from a low level, the firm’s
inclination to advertise remains unchanged; in such a situation, the firm
optimally sells to both types of consumers when not advertising (case 1).
Starting from a high level of τ , when not advertising, the firm optimally sells
to unaware consumers only, and the firm becomes less inclined to advertise
as the tax rate is marginally increased. This was illustrated in Figure 1.
Moreover, with a higher tax, the firm has now a lesser incentive to enter
the market due to lower expected profits. Compared to the case with zero tax,
this suggests that entry costs must be rather low for a mandatory disclosure
rule to be socially desirable. While a formal analysis is beyond the scope
of this paper, our discussion hints at an interesting interaction between tax
policy and public policy as regards mandatory disclosure rules.
17In our specification, the pass-through rate is one half.
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7 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple monopoly product model to capture the effect of
a potentially harmful substance contained in the product. The firm operates
in a market with a population mix of aware and unaware consumers. The
firm may want to hide the fact that its product contains a harmful substance,
as well as the level of it. As a result, a firm discloses all its information if the
level of the harmful substance is low, while it does not disclose if the level
is high. Consumers always benefit from more information; thus, they will
benefit from learning that the substance is indeed harmful and from knowing
how much of the substance the product contains. When endogenizing the
firm’s entry decision, the issue arises that a firm may not find it profitable to
offer the product. This holds if the expected gross profits are below the entry
cost. This makes well-meaning mandatory disclosure rules a double-edged
sword. Given the firm’s entry, more-stringent disclosure rules are consumer-
surplus increasing. However, implementing a strict rule carries the risk that
the firm will not enter. Thus, full mandatory disclosure may be harmful,
and, under some circumstances, awareness-enhancing disclosure that does
not contain information about the level of the potentially harmful substance
may be consumer-surplus superior. Absent regulation, the firm will never
choose such a disclosure rule, while the rule may well be optimal for the
regulator trying to strike a balance between reducing consumer biases and
allowing a firm to extract rents.
We motivated our analysis by referring to potentially harmful substances.
More generally, our analysis applies to products that affect consumers’ util-
ities, although they may not be aware of this at the moment of purchase.
In particular, it applies to complex products about which information is,
in principle, available, but about which consumers may suffer from biased
beliefs at the moment of purchase.18
Selling to consumers who hold biased beliefs because they are kept in
the dark, can be called mis-selling. Whether a certain action should be
considered mis-selling depends on consumer behavior. In a Bayesian world,
consumers may lack information, but they use correct beliefs given their in-
formation. Therefore, they cannot be systematically misled. This also means
that non-disclosure and other attempts to hide unfavorable information, do
not lead to systematically wrong purchase decision. By contrast, if consumers
are unaware of certain product characteristics, the possibility of mis-selling
arises. Here, firms may systematically suppress information. In this context,
18Our analysis can also be seen as a reduced-form model of add-on pricing, where con-
sumers may be adversely surprised by the add-on costs—e.g., of cartridges after buying a
printer or of watching in-room movies in a hotel.
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mandatory testing and disclosure rules are an important policy instrument
to protect consumers. In the case of non-compliance, harsh punishments may
be the only means to deter a firm from ignoring such consumer-protection
policies. Attempts to encourage information gathering by consumers have
little relevance if consumers are completely naive, in the sense that they
are over-confident about their knowledge of the products and believe that
adverse effects cannot materialize.
Empirical evidence by Jin and Leslie (2003) is in line with our argument.
They consider the effect of a mandatory disclosure rule that, starting in 1998,
applied to restaurants in parts of Los Angeles: Restaurants were forced to
display the results of hygiene inspections on a grade card placed in their front
restaurant window. They found that average hygiene scores improved, the
number of hospitalizations due to food poisoning went down and consumer
demand became more sensitive to changes in hygiene. In particular, the third
finding is consistent with consumers initially not being aware of the health
risks involved. Thus, the key impact of the mandatory disclosure rule may
have been direct and indirect effects of increased consumer awareness of the
health risks.19
Our theory applies not only to how a product directly affects consumers,
but also to the type of production processes that is used and the type of
labor contracting within the firm and in vertical supply relationships. To
be applicable, the utility that a consumer derives must depend on the use
of inputs and contracts that the firm uses. This is the case if the utility
function reflects ethical and environmental concerns. Cases in point are the
failure to uphold standards in labor contracts, such as the use of child labor
or forced labor (as exemplified by hand-woven carpets and textiles—recall,
for instance, past media coverage on sweatshops for products by Nike); the
health and safety risks for workers (this applies, e.g., to mining products
and textiles – recent concrete examples are jeans dying in Turkey and textile
manufacturing in Bangladesh), disrespect of environmental standards (e.g.,
in case of textiles and cleaning products); disrespect of indigenous rights (as
happened in case of oil extraction); and animal experiments (e.g., for cos-
19Two caveats are in order: First, we do not claim that the findings in Jin and Leslie
(2003) contradict the Bayesian model. However, the fact that the policy intervention was
triggered by a hidden-camera expose´ done by a local television news channel indicates
that initial consumer unawareness has contributed to the observed effects of the policy
intervention. Second, we admit that our model includes neither the incentive aspect
of mandatory disclosure nor the analysis of reputation effect absent disclosure through
the display of grade cards. As indicated in the modified simple model that includes
moral hazard, the distribution of restaurant types endogenously changes due to the policy
intervention, which then leads to an improved average record of restaurant hygiene.
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metics).20 Under mandatory partial information disclosure, the government
(or NGOs) makes consumers aware of the possible disrespect of certain stan-
dards. Such awareness campaigns make consumers aware of the relevance of
a certain product characteristic that enters the consumer’s utility function
(directly or through peer effects). It is up to the firms to certify that they
follow certain business practices and comply with standards. Such processes
are often certified by third parties. This hints at a potential complementarity
between mandatory information disclosure and private certification efforts:
Partial public information disclosure may be necessary to make private cer-
tification efforts viable in market equilibrium.21
We note that an increase in the share of initially aware consumers may
come from public awareness campaigns. Such campaigns can affect the in-
centives of firms to reveal private information. In particular, if the share of
aware consumers is large, private information disclosure through advertising
is more pronounced. Thus, some initially unaware consumers also become
informed. This suggests that public awareness campaigns can have a multi-
plier effect through private (albeit only partial) information disclosure about
the level of the adverse effect.
20The “war diamonds” from Congo are a concrete example. Here, consumers were
concerned about the effect of upstream profits on the suffering of people, as a consequence
of war that was financed through these profits. In this context, NGOs play an important
role in raising awareness; a firm’s response consists in certifying the origin of inputs: De
Beers’ certification efforts of the origin of its diamonds can be seen as a response to the
consumers being aware that they may be buying war diamonds (which do not make a nice
wedding gift).
21Whether private certification is fully revealing is a different issue. See Biglaiser (1993)
and Lizzeri (1999) on this issue.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Part a) Since we restrict attention to case 1, from (7), (8), and (9), we have
that
∂Epi
∂ρ0
=
∫ â
u−θ
(
a˜N − u+ ρ0∂a˜N
∂ρ0
)
[(1− ρ0)u+ ρ0a˜N ]
2θ
da
−
∫ u
â
(u− a) [(1− (ρ0 + ∆ρ))u+ (ρ0 + ∆ρ) a]
2θ
da
< 0,
where the last inequality holds taking note that
∂a˜N
∂ρ0
= − ∆ρθ
(ρ0 + 2∆ρ)
2 < 0.
Part b)
∂ECS
∂ρ0
=
1
θ
∫ â
u−θ
(Ua (a)− Uu (a)) + ρ0∂Ua (a)
∂ρ0
+ (1− ρ0) ∂Uu (a)
∂ρ0
da
+
1
θ
∫ u
â
Ua (a)− Uu (a) + (ρ0 + ∆ρ) ∂Ua (a)
∂ρ0
+ (1− (ρ0 + ∆ρ)) ∂Uu (a)
∂ρ0
da
+
1
θ
{[ρ0Ua (a) + (1− ρ0)Uu (a)] |a→â−
− [(ρ0 + ∆ρ)Ua (a) + (1− (ρ0 + ∆ρ))Uu (a)] |a→â+} ∂â
∂ρ0
> 0.
The inequality above holds since
∂
∂ρ0
Ua (a) =
∂
∂ρ0
(
1
2
Qa (a)
2
)
= Qa (a)
∂Qa (a)
∂ρ0
= −Qa (a) ∂p (a)
∂ρ0
> 0, for a > â, as
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∂∂ρ0
Uu (a) =
∂
∂ρ0
(
(a− p (a))Qu (a)− 1
2
Q2u (a)
)
= (a− p (a)) ∂Qu (a)
∂ρ0
= −Qa (a) ∂p (a)
∂ρ0
> 0, where
∂p (a)
∂ρ0
= −u− a
2
< 0 ,
∂â
∂ρ0
< 0
and the fact that Ua (a) ≥ Uu (a), as
Ua (a) =
{
maxQ (a− p (a))Q− 12Q2, if a > â
maxQ (a− pN)Q− 12Q2, if a < â
≥ Uu (a) =
{
(a− p (a))Qu (a)− 12Q2u (a) , if a > â
(a− pN)Qu − 12Q2u, if a < â
,
where Qu (a) and Qu are unaware consumers’ optimal quantities under the
wrong prior that the product has quality u.
Part c) To prove that ∂ETS/∂ρ0 can be positive or negative, it suffices to
illustrate that this can happen when ρ0 → 1 and ∆ρ→ 0. In this case, notice
that ∂â/∂ρ0 → 0, â→ u−θ, and p (a) = ((1− ρ0 −∆ρ)u+ (ρ0 + ∆ρ) a) /2→
a/2.Hence, we have
lim
ρ0→1,∆ρ→0
∂ETS
∂ρ0
= lim
ρ0→1,∆ρ→0
1
θ
∫ u
u−θ
TSa (a)− TSu (a) + ∂TSa (a)
∂ρ0
da
= lim
ρ0→1,∆ρ→0
1
θ
∫ u
u−θ
[
(Qa (a)−Qu (a))
(
a− Qu (a) +Qa (a)
2
)
+ (a−Qa (a)) ∂Qa (a)
∂ρ0
]
da
= lim
ρ0→1,∆ρ→0
1
θ
∫ u
u−θ
[
(a− u)
(
a− Qu (a) +Qa (a)
2
)
− (a−Qa (a)) ∂p (a)
∂ρ0
]
da
=
1
θ
∫ u
u−θ
(a− u)
(
a− u
2
)
− a
2
u− a
2
da
= −1
4
θ
(
u− 3θ) ,
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which is positive if u < 3θ and positive if the reverse inequality holds. The
equalities are results of tedious calculation, by noticing also that TSa (a) =
aQa (a) − 1/2Q2a (a) and TSu (a) = aQu (a) − 1/2Q2u (a) and that Qa (a) =
a− p (a) and Qu (a) = u− p (a).
8.2 Proof of Corollary 1
If K < Epi|ρ0=1−∆ρ, the firm will enter for any ρ0, and, hence, the result
follows immediately from Proposition 2.
Suppose that Epi|ρ0=1−∆ρ < K < Epi|ρ0=0. When ρ̂0 ∈ (0,∆ρ), a marginal
increase in in ρ0 does not change the firm’s entry decision. From Proposition
2, we know that consumer surplus is decreasing. At point ρ̂0, a marginal
increase in ρ0 makes it unprofitable for the firm to enter and, hence, reduces
consumer surplus to zero.
If K > Epi|ρ0=0, the firm will not enter for any ρ0. Hence, the consumer
surplus is zero.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 1
The ordering Epia < Epin and ECSa > ECSn follows directly from Propo-
sition 2. Hence, we need only prove that Epif < Epia and ECSf > ECSa.
From equations (1), (8) and our analysis in Section 3, we have
Epif − Epia = 1
θ
∫ â
u−θ
[(1− ρ′′0)u+ ρ′′0a]2
4
− [(1− ρ
′
0)u+ ρ
′
0a˜N ]
2
4
da
< 0.
The inequality is due to the fact that [(1− ρ′′0)u+ ρ′′0a]2 /4 is decreasing in
a and that [(1− ρ′′0)u+ ρ′′0â]2 = [(1− ρ′0)u+ ρ′0a˜N ]2. Denote U∗a (a) (resp.
U∗u (a)) as the aware (resp. unaware) consumers utility when the firm faces
mandatory full information disclosure and its product has quality a. Notice
that U∗a (a) (resp. U
∗
u (a)) and Ua (a) (resp. Uu (a)) coincide at (â, u]. (Here,
we use the notations Ua (a), p (a) , pN , â, a˜N etc. to denote the corresponding
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variables when the awareness-enhancing disclosure rule is imposed.)
ECSf − ECSa
=
1
θ
∫ â
u−θ
ρ′′0U
∗
a (a) + (1− ρ′′0)U∗u (a)− (ρ′0Ua (a) + (1− ρ′0)Uu (a)) da
+
1
θ
∫ u
â
ρ′′0U
∗
a (a) + (1− ρ′′0)U∗u (a)− (ρ′0Ua (a) + (1− ρ′0)Uu (a))
>
1
θ
∫ â
u−θ
ρ′0U
∗
a (a) + (1− ρ′0)U∗u (a)− (ρ′0Ua (a) + (1− ρ′0)Uu (a)) da
> 0.
The first inequality is due to U∗a (a) > U
∗
u (a) and that U
∗
a (a) > Ua (a)
and U∗u (a) > Uu (a) for a ∈ (â, u]. To prove the second inequality, we will
show, first, that
∫ â
u−θ U
∗
a (a) − Ua (a) da > 0 and, second, that
∫ â
u−θ U
∗
u (a) −
Uu (a) da > 0. It is useful to note that p
∗ (â) = pN , where p∗ (â) is the firm’s
optimal price when the firm faces the mandatory full information disclosure
and its product has quality a.∫ â
u−θ
U∗a (a)− Ua (a) da =
∫ â
u−θ
max
Q
{(a− p∗ (a))Q− 1
2
Q2} − Ua (a) da
>
∫ â
u−θ
max
Q
{(a− p∗ (â))Q− 1
2
Q2} − Ua (a) da
=
∫ â
u−θ
max
Q
{(a− pN)Q− 1
2
Q2} − Ua (a) da
>
∫ â
u−θ
max
Q
{(a˜N − pN)Q− 1
2
Q2} − Ua (a) da
= 0,
The first inequality is due to p∗ (a) < p∗ (â) and that maxQ{(a− p)Q −
1
2
Q2} is decreasing in p. The second inequality is due to the fact that
maxQ{(a− pN)Q − 12Q2} is convex in a. The proof that
∫ â
u−1 U
∗
u (a) −
Uu (a) da > 0 is similar. The basic logic is that, by p
∗ (a) < p∗ (â) = pN
for a < â, mandatory full information disclosure reduces the price of the
product and, hence, benefits unaware consumers.
38
